Grant Thornton liquidators Adele Hicks and Malcolm Moore have filed High Court proceedings against four former SolarZero directors, Simon McIver, Valerie Speth, founder Andy Booth and Charlie Reid. They allege reckless trading contributed to the company’s $476 million collapse. None of the allegations have been tested in court, and the directors had not responded publicly when the claim was reported.
This is no longer just the story of a failed solar business. It is the clearest live test yet of where New Zealand draws the line between an ambitious growth bet and director recklessness, and that line matters to every board running a leveraged, pre-profit company.
A credible story that never made money
On paper, SolarZero looked like the energy transition done right. Grant Thornton’s initial report in 2024 described a business with around 15,500 customers and roughly 40% of the rooftop solar market, selling ‘energy as a service’ on mostly 25-year fixed-fee contracts. BlackRock’s climate infrastructure fund bought it in 2022 for $110 million and then injected a further $147.8 million, with no return on that extra capital. The same report found the business was operationally unable to reach breakeven. When the funding ran out in late November 2024, so did the company.
The public purse was in it too. Government-owned NZ Green Investment Finance had extended a $145 million loan facility, which in 2025 the NZ Herald reported sat alongside $220 million in international credit lines from First Sentier, Natixis and Societe Generale. Big names, big cheques, and a business model that never washed its own face.
The hole is enormous
By December 2025, liquidators had realised $2,777,187, much of it R&D tax credits. Against that, the third liquidators’ report listed securitisation trust claims of $436,383,125, trade creditors of $5,970,152 and employee claims of $2,779,220. Unsecured creditors who lodged claims were owed nearly $24 million. One creditor even claimed in 2025 that two linked trusts were owed $979 million.
Those numbers explain why the directors are now in the frame. Asset sales will never close a gap that size. Claims against directors, and potentially their insurers, are one of the few levers left. Any recoveries will be distributed under schedule 7 of the Companies Act, following an investigation into governance records, financing arrangements and related transactions.
Hicks was blunt about the motive. “The company benefitted from significant public and private investment and left creditors with substantial losses, so it’s important to pursue those claims and maximise any potential recovery,” she said. The view from the trade floor is simpler. “Nine of my guys were made redundant. So yeah, somebody should be held accountable,” one affected tradie said.
A law nobody can read clearly
The case turns on sections 135 and 136 of the Companies Act 1993, and that is where it gets uncomfortable for directors everywhere. In March 2026, University of Auckland academic Benjamin Liu argued section 135 has “long been criticised for its vague, open-textured language”, with terms like “substantial risk” offering little practical guidance. He warned directors may favour immediate liquidation over rescue strategies, and that legal risk may deter capable people from taking board seats.
Australia gives directors a statutory safe harbour for genuine restructuring attempts. The UK only bites once directors knew or should have known insolvent liquidation was unavoidable. New Zealand has neither, and the Law Commission’s review of director liability is not due until 2027.
That creates a real dilemma. Creditors deserve protection, and a business that burned through a quarter of a billion dollars of owner capital without a path to profit deserves scrutiny. But pro-growth boards also need to know the rules. A ruling that treats every pre-profit, debt-funded scale-up as reckless by definition would chill exactly the risk capital New Zealand says it wants.
Why every boardroom should care
Failure is not rare right now. Companies Office data shows 710 liquidator appointments in the first quarter of 2026, up 4.9% on a year earlier and 12.9% on 2024. More directors are sitting on boards where solvency questions are live.
The practical lessons are already clear. Document the basis for every decision to keep trading. Stress-test the funding runway, not just the growth plan. Do not assume a blue-chip shareholder or government lender has done your due diligence for you. And check what your D&O cover actually responds to.
Whatever the High Court decides about McIver, Speth, Booth and Reid will shape how New Zealand directors weigh ambition against caution for years. Until Parliament acts on the Law Commission’s work, judges, not lawmakers, will define recklessness. SolarZero may end up writing the rulebook its own board never had.
Sources
- Newsroom: SolarZero tradie welcomes move to hold directors accountable (2026-10-01)
- RNZ: Liquidators start court proceedings against SolarZero directors (2026-10-01)
- Insolvency Guardian: SolarZero liquidators sue four former directors over company’s $476m collapse (2026-10-01)
- NZ Herald: SolarZero collapse – Liquidators claw back $2.7m but creditor claims two trusts owed $979m (2025-12-23)
- Grant Thornton: Liquidators’ initial report on the state of affairs of SolarZero (2024-12-03)
- Grant Thornton: Third liquidators’ report (2025-12-22)
- University of Auckland: Insolvency spikes put company law in spotlight (2026-03-12)
- Companies Office: Latest company statistics (2026-08-10)
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