New Zealand often describes itself as a global food powerhouse, but that strength rests on a fragile foundation that is now being exposed.
A war in the Middle East is highlighting a serious national security blind spot: the country relies heavily on imported fertiliser yet has limited contingency planning for major global supply disruptions.
New Zealand is among the world’s leading exporters of dairy, beef and veal. That export strength is directly tied to uninterrupted access to imported fertiliser. If supplies are disrupted, production falls — and with it, export earnings and broader economic stability.
At the centre of the problem is structural dependence on foreign supply chains. More than 80% of countries rely on imports for at least 75% of their fertiliser needs. Fertiliser production is highly concentrated in a small number of countries, leaving importing nations, such as New Zealand, exposed to geopolitical shocks beyond their control.
This creates a systemic vulnerability: when global supply is disrupted, whether by conflict, trade restrictions, or shipping blockades, the effects are immediate and widespread.
That vulnerability is now being stress-tested.
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow but strategically critical shipping route between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, carries around a quarter of global seaborne oil, as well as significant volumes of natural gas and fertiliser.
The prolonged tensions in the Middle East, including the broader US-Israel conflict involving Iran, have raised concerns about the security of this passage.
The Gulf region plays an outsized role in fertiliser exports. Between 2023 and 2025, countries including Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia accounted for around 36% of global urea exports, a key nitrogen-based fertiliser heavily used in New Zealand and global agriculture.
Because urea is derived from natural gas, rising gas prices, already pushed higher by conflict-driven instability, directly increase fertiliser costs. Those higher costs ultimately flow through to farmers and, eventually, consumers.
Meanwhile, China, another major global fertiliser supplier, has imposed export restrictions, further tightening global supply and reinforcing price pressures.
The timing is critical. Fertiliser availability matters most just before planting. If supply is delayed or priced out of reach, agricultural yields fall, reducing output and increasing reliance on higher-priced imports.
Does New Zealand have a strategy in place?
These developments raise a broader strategic question: how resilient are national food systems when they depend so heavily on external supply chains controlled by geopolitically sensitive regions?
Industry voices such as Eat New Zealand chief executive Angela Clifford have argued that the country repeatedly reacts to crises rather than building long-term resilience between shocks. In Australia, GrainGrowers has called for a dedicated fertiliser taskforce, strategic stockpiles, and diversification of supply sources to reduce exposure to external disruption.
There are potential pathways forward, including increased domestic capability and alternative technologies. Biofertilisers, which use micro-organisms to improve soil nutrient availability, offer a partial alternative that reduces reliance on imported inputs and global logistics chains.
Longer term, projects such as New Zealand’s Kapuni initiative point to another option: producing urea domestically using renewable energy and green hydrogen, reducing dependence on imported natural gas-based inputs while strengthening supply security.
However, these solutions remain in early stages and are unlikely to replace existing supply chains in the near term.
The broader reality is that fertiliser insecurity is not a new risk, but it is becoming more strategically significant. Prices surged after COVID-19 disruptions and again following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, demonstrating how quickly external shocks translate into domestic cost pressures.
For geographically isolated, export-dependent economies like New Zealand, the issue is ultimately one of economic sovereignty. Exposure to concentrated global supply chains means that external conflicts and trade restrictions can directly impact domestic food production and national income.
As global instability increases, the question is no longer whether these risks exist but whether policy settings are strong enough to withstand them or whether the next disruption will once again expose the same structural weaknesses.