The rebrand cycle runs on schedule
Every decade or so, New Zealand rediscovers that its capital markets have a recycling problem. Not the good kind. A developer or entrepreneur presides over a spectacular failure, leaves creditors holding the bag, then resurfaces months or years later seeking fresh investment for a new venture. No mandatory disclosure of the prior wreckage. No central register linking the person to their corporate history in a way ordinary investors can easily find. No barrier to entry unless a court has formally disqualified them as a director or adjudicated them bankrupt.
The pattern is playing out right now. In March, BusinessDesk reported that creditors of Shundi Tamaki Village are chasing alleged $200 million in debts related to a development that was never built. B2B News covered the Babich Rd developer case last week, where $2 million in house deposits vanished into a company that couldn’t deliver. These aren’t aberrations. They’re features of a system designed, by omission, to let failure quietly rebrand itself.
Small-time operators, same playbook
Consider Evan Price. In 2022, Newsroom reported that Price’s company Latitude Dynamix Holdings had been liquidated with over $600,000 owed to employees, landlords and investors, including former Tauranga mayor Tenby Powell and the family of Taika Waititi. Investors had backed ventures ranging from a Warner Bros Pokemon movie production to a 220-hectare Pokemon family fun park. Price then pitched a new e-commerce platform to a US company without disclosing any of this history.
By 2024, Newsroom found Price had resurfaced again with GenX Global Limited, claiming to run a resin and furniture-making factory in Rakaia. Investigation revealed most product images on GenX’s Facebook pages were lifted from Pinterest and overseas company websites. A North Island furniture-maker paid $2,500 as a down payment for resin that never arrived. A Wanaka steelmaker paid $1,000 for 13kg of resin that was never delivered. Price was living in a caravan at the Red Shed in Rakaia.
Small numbers. But the mechanics are identical to what happens at scale.
Du Val proved the pattern scales to nine figures
In 2024, Newsroom reported that the Du Val Group, owned by Kenyon and Charlotte Clarke, had $210 million in liabilities versus $189 million in assets as of September 2023. One investor had put up to $1.2 million into the group, all proceeds from selling her house. An elderly couple had invested nearly $1 million expecting 10% quarterly returns that dried up two years prior.
The critical detail: in 2012, companies owned by Kenyon Clarke and his mother were liquidated owing over $56 million. He was nonetheless able to build a new property empire, raise funds from retail investors, and reach a scale where the group owed more than $300 million when it collapsed. By March 2024, contractors were still chasing unpaid invoices while Clarke posted an Instagram video checking out a $4.7 million Ferrari.
The wholesale loophole makes it worse
New Zealand’s Financial Markets Act creates a two-tier system. Firms offering financial products to wholesale investors, certified by a lawyer, accountant or financial adviser, face far less disclosure and regulatory oversight than those offering to retail investors. No product disclosure statement, no licensed supervisor, no FMA licence. The FMA itself has acknowledged it has little information to monitor wholesale market activities.
Commerce and Consumer Affairs Minister Scott Simpson has sought advice on whether law reform is needed. No legislative change has been announced.
Capital is flowing and the due diligence isn’t keeping up
The timing compounds the risk. According to the NZGCP Young Company Finance Spring 2025 Report, H1 2025 recorded the highest deal volume and investment for a first-half period, with total deals up 60% year-on-year and total investment of $361.7 million. Angel investment tripled. More money chasing deals means more opportunity for operators with chequered histories to find willing backers.
In October 2024, Ed McKnight, then-resident economist at Opes Partners, told NZ Property Investor: “It’s quite difficult to sort the good developers from the less-than-desirable operators because there is not always something dodgy investors can see from the outside.” Andrew Guest, then-founding director of Viranda, was blunter: “Property investing, like any type of investing, is totally dependent on the integrity of the party you’re investing with.”
Better information, not more regulation
The fix does not necessarily require heavier regulation. It requires better information architecture. The Companies Office register exists, but connecting an individual to their full corporate history across multiple entities requires effort most investors don’t perform. A mandatory disclosure requirement for capital raisers, linking them to prior directorships, liquidations, and outstanding creditor claims, would be a lightweight intervention with outsized impact.
Without it, the cycle will continue precisely as it always has. Failure, rebrand, fresh capital, repeat. The only variable is the number of zeros on the losses.
Sources
- BusinessDesk: Shundi Tamaki Village creditors chase alleged $200m debts (2026-03-13)
- Newsroom: Failed entrepreneur Evan Price embarks on new venture – without disclosing history (2022-12-12)
- Newsroom: Failed entrepreneur resurfaces with bold business claims (2024-05-23)
- Newsroom: Mum-and-dad investors threaten to take developer Du Val to court (2024-02-12)
- Newsroom: Developer Du Val settles with subbies – but faces new woes (2024-03-08)
- NZGCP Young Company Finance Spring 2025 Report (2025-05-01)
- NZ Property Investor: Dodging the dodgy developers (2024-10-07)
- B2B News: Babich Rd developer lost $2m in house deposits exposing NZ law gaps (2026-05-05)