November 18, 2026

Zero payments processed, yet Qbanq still landed in a Russian sanctions exposé

A close-up of a laptop displaying code in a dimly lit room with a coffee mug nearby.

Qbanq, an Auckland crypto payments company, has never processed a payment. It has still ended up in an international sanctions investigation. The UK-based Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) has linked Qbanq to the sanctioned Russian A7 network. CIR says Amani AI, a payment system used by A7 International and nominally owned by a Togo-registered company, was actually operated by Qbanq.

This is not a crypto story. It is a counterparty hygiene story, and the exposure pathway is one most New Zealand compliance checklists are not built to catch.

The risk came in through the code

Tehmus Mistry, Qbanq’s sole director and shareholder, says he knew nothing of any A7 connection. He told the Herald Qbanq had not processed any payments, that the flagged code would be replaced before launch, and that the finding “was actually a shock to me.”

The same CIR report points to the likely route. It names Russian programmer Artem Shelengovskiy, who moved to New Zealand in 2022, and his companies True Code and Backend as having helped launch A7 International, an Azerbaijan-based expansion of the network. Shelengovskiy and True Code’s New Zealand office did not respond to the Herald.

Take Mistry at his word and the lesson is sharper, not softer. A firm can do no business with Russia, have no Russian customers and move no money, and still find its infrastructure entangled with a designated entity because of who wrote its backend.

A7 is not a small-time operation

In 2025, CIR described A7 as an enterprise built to enable large-scale sanctions evasion, claiming more than US$86 billion in transactions in under a year. It was led by fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor and co-owned by Promsvyazbank, a sanctioned Russian state military bank.

The numbers have only grown. The ICIJ reports A7 processed at least 283 tonnes of cash rubles, worth more than US$14 billion, between November 2024 and July 2025. On 1 October the US Treasury designated it a “significant transnational criminal organization”. Treasury’s red-flag list identifies front companies, or “Sub-Agents”, in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, the Seychelles, Turkey and the UAE that processed more than US$17 billion in 18 months.

The network did not just exploit minnows. More than US$6.9 billion moved through Standard Chartered, Citigroup, DBS and First Abu Dhabi Bank, and anti-money laundering experts warn more large banks will be caught.

Wellington has already drawn the line

New Zealand sanctioned A7 in its 35th round of Russia measures in May, describing it as “an alternative payment provider whose service is used widely for the evasion of sanctions against Russia.” Foreign Minister Winston Peters said at the time that those supporting the war online “will face real consequences, including sanctions.” A7 sits on MFAT’s Russia Sanctions Register, designated 7 May.

The prohibitions are broad. MFAT’s banking guidance bars New Zealanders from dealing with assets owned or controlled by sanctioned persons, assets that would benefit them or evade sanctions, and services they provide. Services is the word tech firms should underline.

Nor is enforcement theoretical. In June, police raided properties in Auckland, Christchurch and Melbourne over suspected breaches, with a restraining order obtained over a Christchurch property. Detective Inspector Christiaan Barnard said all companies must “assess potential exposure to sanctioned activities, and implement robust due diligence processes”.

Where the compliance checklist goes blind

Standard due diligence screens customers and direct counterparties. A7’s model is designed to defeat exactly that. Ramkishen Rajan of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy explains that an A7-controlled overseas company pays suppliers in its own name, concealing the Russian buyer. Limited visibility, he argues, does not excuse weak checks.

The government itself has little idea what this costs business. MFAT’s 2025 statutory review acknowledged the regime imposed “significant compliance costs” but held no data on their scale or how many firms were affected. That is a fair criticism of officialdom, but it does not shift liability off the business.

The practical response is not expensive. Know who wrote your code and who maintains it. Ask where white-label payment or crypto infrastructure originates. Trace ownership chains that run through Togo, Azerbaijan, the Seychelles or the UAE before you sign, not after a researcher in London does it for you.

The next name may be a bigger one

Qbanq was small, pre-launch and, on its director’s account, unwitting. That is precisely why it matters. Treasury says it will keep adding Sub-Agents privately, and investigators are mapping firms officials have not yet named. New Zealand fintechs, software houses and corporates using offshore developers should assume the A7 web is larger than the public lists show, and audit their technical supply chain accordingly. The cheapest time to find a sanctions problem is before your name appears next to it.

Sources

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